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ABSTRACT 
 
Vermont is the first and only state in the US to establish mandatory labels for food containing 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). This thesis investigates the impact of the mandatory 
labeling law as it relates to changes in prices, quantities sold, and opinions of GMOs. First, grocery 
store scanner data from Vermont and Oregon are compared using triple difference (difference-in-
difference-in-difference) models. Next, Vermont, Oregon, and Colorado survey response data are 
compared using difference-in-difference models. The findings reveal that there is a general price 
premium for non-GMO goods of $0.05/oz across all states and times, that mandatory labeling laws 
do not result in a short-term change in quantities sold or prices of GMO products, and that both 
mandatory labeling laws and failed mandatory labeling referendums cause an increase in support 
for GMOs in the food supply. The implications of this research are that mandatory GMO labels did 
not impact short-term prices or sales and increased the level of support for GMOs.  
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CHAPTER 1. 
Introduction 
 
 Ever since the release of the first Genetically Engineered Organisms (GMOs) into the 
consumer food market in the 1980s, the economic, ecological, social, and health impacts of the 
products have been debated. Many people and organizations are involved in the debate: agri-food 
and chemical companies, academics from disciplines ranging from natural and food science to the 
humanities, consumer information environmental and health advocates, and non-profit 
organizations. In July 2016, Vermont became the first state in the US to pass as a mandatory GMO 
labeling law. Although the law was only in place until August 2016, it is the only natural experiment 
that has occurred in the US. The focus of this thesis is not to make claims about the value or harms 
of GMOs, but instead to focus on consumer reactions to the GMO and GMO-free products when 
information is mandatory and when it is not available. Specifically, the intent is to see if the law in 
Vermont and failed referendums elsewhere resulted in changes in prices, units sold, and opinions 
of GMOs.    
 The goal of this research is to evaluate survey responses and consumer reactions to GMO 
labeled products in the marketplace. The reason why such research is important is that it can help 
resolve the debate of whether GMO labels serve as a “warning” or as a “guidepost” for consumers. 
The null hypotheses tested is that in response to the passage of a mandatory labeling law in 
Vermont, H.112, there has been no negative impact on the price, units sold, or opinion of GMOs 
in Vermont. If we do not reject the null hypothesis, it suggests that the law does not harm the 
economy and instead simply increases transparency.  
 The implications of this study primarily relate to future labeling practices. In august of 
2016, the federal law, Public Law 114-216, established a mandate that a national GMO labeling 
regime should be established and implemented by 2020. However, if no national labeling regime 
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is established within a reasonable period of time, then individual states may once again work toward 
establishing their own regulations. The findings of this study can serve as a guide for the national 
or state labeling regimes. 
 This organization of this theses will be as follows: (1) Introduction – a general introduction 
about the topic, (2) Expanded Literature Review – A detailed exploration into the labeling and a 
background examination of the theoretical and methodological approaches to the data used herein, 
(3) Article 1 – Do Mandatory GMO Labels Expand non-GMO Niche Food Markets: A Vermont 
and Oregon Case Study, (4) Article 2 – Do Mandatory Labeling Laws and Referendums Affect 
Opinions on GMOs?, (5) General Conclusion and Policy Implications.  
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CHAPTER 2. 
Expanded Literature Review  
 
Generic Labeling Impacts  
 
  While humans have always had some concerns about the food they eat, concern about the 
impact on food of recent technologies has been increasing in recent decades. Technological 
innovation ranging from pesticide use to fishing practices has led consumers to be more concerned 
about the impact of what they are eating for their bodies and on the planet. Trends such as the 
“clean label” movement indicate a desire for more transparency in the contents of food, directly on 
the product’s label (Clean Label, 2018). Increasingly, younger consumers are becoming more 
concerned about the social and environmental impacts of their food purchase decisions (Cargill, 
2017). The issue of labeling food products has been a matter of public debate for decades in the 
U.S. where it is structured as the right of companies to highlight the beneficial aspects of their 
products or efforts by consumers with the help of legislators to try to comprehend and use label 
information (Kolodinsky, 2012). 
 
Impacts of Label Introduction 
 
 The introduction of labeling regimes can result in drastically different outcomes. Some 
labels such as Recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST)-free or fair trade can result in a price 
premium whereas geographic labeling of products such as regional Spanish beef has no effect on 
units sold or price (Kolodinsky, 2008; Loureiro & McClusky, 2000; Verbeke & Ward, 2006).  rBST 
is an early version of a GMO with unique labeling. Between September 1995 and August 1996, the 
labeling of products containing rBST was mandatory in Vermont. In studying the impacts of 
voluntary rBST labels on price and sales, Dhar and Foltz (2005) found that rBST free labels resulted 
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in greater demand and higher prices for non-rBST products. Mandatory labeling of rBST products 
did not have the intended effect of communicating information to the public (Kolodinsky et al., 
1998). The confusing labeling practice of small stickers accompanied by fliers posted nearby was 
not a simple enough way to effectively transmit the intended interpretation.  Mandatory rBST labels 
are only one example of packaging that attempted to create a transparent signal to enable customers 
to make their own purchasing decision (Kolodinsky, 2008). 
 Products that use labels such as fair trade or environmentally friendly have better sales and 
price premiums after the labels are adopted. When consumers consider coffee purchases, they are 
willing to pay a premium for fair trade and shade grown coffee more than for organic products 
(Loureiro & Lotade, 2005). The sales of tuna dropped markedly after it was discovered that fishing 
practices were killing dolphins. The introduction of Dolphin-Safe labels not only corrected for a 
drop in demand, after controversy emerged, but also increased both units sold and prices (Teisl et 
al., 2002). Similarly, when customers were offered labels indicating lower CO2 emissions to 
produce the products, they were willing to pay a small premium and consistently chose the lower 
CO2 products when prices were held equal (Vanclay et al., 2010). The conclusion that greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission labels are effective was questioned by subsequent empirical studies using UK 
grocery store scanner data (Kortelainen et al., 2016).    
Different label types lead to different willingness to pay for GMO products (Huffman et 
al., 2003). For example, Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2002) found that when GMO labels are 
placed on the back of a container consumers ignore the information. Given the different responses 
that labels can produce, it is valuable to study the way in which people respond to GMOs outside 
the context of a lab experiment.  
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GMO Labeling 
 
 The USDA defines GMOs as “an organism produced through genetic modification” where 
genetic modification can be “manipulation of an organism’s genes by introducing, eliminating or 
rearranging specific genes using the methods of modern molecular biology, particularly those 
techniques referred to as recombinant DNA techniques” (USDA, 2018). Typically, GMO products 
are made by having a gene from a different species inserted into the DNA of the target plant or 
animal. Farmers use GMO species typically because the plants are resistant to specific weed killers, 
allowing for larger doses of the chemicals to be applied without harming the principal crop. In 2016 
U.S. farms devoted 72.9 million hectares (MHA) to GMO or biotech crops account for 
approximately 23% of all principal crops nationally (ISAAA, 2016; USDA, 2017). The primary 
GMO crops are corn, soy, cotton, alfalfa, papaya, canola, and sugar beets. GMO corn has increased 
from 25% of all corn acreage in 2000 to 92% in 2017 (USFDA, 2018). GMO soybean cover has 
increased from 54% to 94% and cottonseed from 61% to 96% in the same period (USFDA, 2018). 
As of 2017, GMO canola accounts for 90-91% of total canola acreage, alfalfa 14-18% of the total, 
GMOs account for 100% of sugar beet acreage (ISAAA, 2016; USDA, 2017). GMO potato, 
papaya, and squash crops account for less than .01% each in 2017 but are expected to increase in 
the future (ISAAA, 2016).  
 New technological methods for developing GMO products are rapidly emerging. Scientific 
techniques currently used to produce GMOs include Agrobacterium, Biolistic Transformation, 
Electroporation, and Antisense technology (Maghari & Ardekani, 2011).1 With the advent of 
Clustered Regular Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) countless new varieties of 
                                                          
1 Agrobacterium is a bacterium that uses horizontal gene transfer between itself and plants. Biolistic 
Transformation is the use of a gene gun that delivers exogenous DNA to a target nucleus. Electroporation 
applies an electrical field that permeates a membrane permitting the introduction of DNA. Antisense 
technology synthesizes strands of DNA or RNA to create “off” switches for specific genes.  
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genetically engineering crops are expected to be developed. However, ever since the European 
Union decided to include CRISPR under the GMO umbrella there has been some ambiguity as to 
what to consider GMO (Abbott, 2018).  
 
The GMO Labeling Debate Thus far 
  
Two main paradigms surround the GMO labelling debate. On one side, there are labeling 
opponents who believe that any GMO label will be perceived as a warning, in much the same way 
that a label informing consumers about the increased risk of lung cancer tied to smoking is warning. 
On the other side of the debate are consumer rights and environmental groups, small farmers, and 
health advocates who see labels as an information signal. Modern consumers tend to believe that 
GMO technology is meaningfully different from earlier forms of selective breading. Surveys show 
that approximately 92% of Americans believe that GMO products should be labeled (Consumer 
Reports National Research Center, 2014).  
 While there are many arguments that emerge from those who oppose labeling, the two most 
frequent are (1) GMO labels will scare and confuse consumers who will view labels as warnings, 
and (2) labels will drive up the prices of both GMO and non-GMO foods. The “warning camp” 
believes that consumers do not have a good enough understanding of genetic engineering to make 
smart decisions about the food they eat (Kolodinsky et al., 2004; Scientific American, 2013). The 
price argument focuses on the fact that changing labels costs money, that segmenting the market 
creates premiums that may price lower income consumers out of buying non-GMO goods if GMO 
goods are labeled, and that generating fear forces farmers and companies to spend more to reassure 
consumers, resulting in lower profit margins and potentially higher prices to cover the costs (Lesser 
& Lynch, 2014; Scientific American, 2013). The fear of higher costs has actually resulted in 
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multimillion-dollar campaigns to sway consumers to accept GMO foods without mandatory 
labeling laws (Coleman, 2016).   
 Arguments in favor of labelling have also emerged. The most frequent and one even shared 
by many proponents of GMO technology is the consumers’ right to know (Just Label It, 2018). 
Those who advocate for labeling tend to view labels as an answer to information asymmetry present 
in the marketplace (Golan et al., 2001, Kolodinsky, 2012). The logic behind the information 
asymmetry is that producers know more about the products, prices, manufacturing practices, and 
markets than do consumers. As such producers are able to disproportionately increase the amount 
of producer surplus as compared to consumer surplus in market transactions. Access to perfect 
information, one of the economic assumptions for well behaving markets is thus violated. This 
argument is primarily rooted in consumer rights advocacy. In addition, many supporters of labelling 
focus on the potential health or environmental impacts. 
Credence characteristics are those that cannot independently be verified by a typical 
consumer without the information being explicitly available, such as organic, place of origin, 
nutritional value, etc. The application of signaling credence attributes can have various effects; it 
can create separate markets for labeled products, simultaneously lowering the price of the perceived 
inferior good and creating a price premium for the superior good (Grolleau & Caswell, 2006; 
Larson, 2003; Mattoo & Singh, 1994). In the case of GMO goods, where between 10% and 20% 
would prefer to never consume them, this would likely indicate a decrease in price of GMO goods 
and an increase in price for non-GMO goods (Buhr et al., 1993). If the end goal is maximizing 
consumer utility, then this could be beneficial for the consumers who are indifferent between GMO 
and non-GMO foods. However, differences in the pricing of the two types of goods could also price 
out consumers who would like to purchase non-GMO foods but could not afford to purchase them 
at the higher price point.  
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Test and Experiments 
 
 The majority of data about GMO preferences in the labeling debate has been from surveys 
and experimental auctions (McCluskey & Loureiro, 2003). Mail and phone surveys tend to reveal 
that messaging and language impacts consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for GMO and non-GMO 
foods (Han & Harrison, 2007; Lusk, 2003). Student surveys including Bernard et al. (2009) show 
a general decrease in WTP for GMO goods. Surveys highlighting the beneficial aspects of GMOs 
revealed a $0.006 to $0.087 higher WTP for GMO tomatoes, and $0.33 premium for corn chips 
(Loureiro & Bugbee, 2005; Lusk et al., 2001a). Surveys that did not highlight beneficial traits 
resulted in a $0.056 to $0.39 higher WTP for GMO free products (Brun & Campbell, 2016; 
Bukenya & Wright, 2007; Loureiro & Hine, 2002; Lusk et al., 2001a; Onyango et al., 2006; 
Rickertson et al., 2017). 
In bid experiments conducted in Europe, researchers founder that consumers preferred to 
pay 37% less for GMO products compared with non-GMO products when neither beneficial nor 
detrimental aspects of the technology were highlighted (Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux, 2001).  
When GMO labels were present, but attention to them was not emphasized, they resulted in a 2% 
price discount, as opposed to a 25% discount when they were emphasized (Noussair, Robin, and 
Ruffieux, 2002). In one auction students were not willing to pay a premium for non-GMO chips 
(Lusk et al., 2001b). When asked to bid for beneficial GMO vs no GMO traits, students had a 
higher willingness to pay for GMO lean meat and other beneficial GMO features (Buhr et al., 1993; 
Colson et al., 2011a; Colson et al., 2011b). Using mixed auction item and information design, 
different information can drastically change the discount rate for GMO products (Colson & 
Huffman, 2011; Rousu et al., 2007). 
Experiments on volunteers were conducted by Huffman et al. (2003) using an auction 
model where participants bid on products to estimate price levels. These experiments produced a 
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14% discount for GMO labeled products compared with non-GMO equivalents. Other student 
auctions revealed a $0.02 to $0.06 greater WTP for non-GMO products (Wachnheim & Vanwechel, 
2004).  
 
Who Eats GMO  
 
A challenge to many of the surveys on who is more WTP for GMO food is the assumption 
that individuals actually purchase the products in the first place. When surveyed, there was a 
smaller difference of WTP for GMO vs non-GMO when individuals were asked about processed 
food and a larger difference in WTP when asked about produce (He & Bernard, 2001). However, 
produce is much less likely to contain GMOs than processed foods that would include ingredients 
such as corn derivatives, beet sugar, and canola oil. If a household does not purchase processed 
foods, then its likelihood of interacting with GMO products is much lower. Therefore, surveys and 
experiments have some limitations. In addition, because many of these experiments and surveys 
were conducted on small populations, students, and required artificial stimuli (such as hearing pro 
or anti GMO messaging before being asked about their opinion), the pure effect of GMO labels on 
price and demand is uncertain. Studies that seek information about WTP and acceptance of GMOs 
tend to control for age, gender, income, and other demographic variables when applicable.  
In general, the acceptance of GMO products is linked to risk-benefit analysis where 
consumers who perceive benefits to themselves and society are more willing to consume GMO 
goods, and those who do not, are less likely (Han & Harrison, 2007; Lusk & Coble, 2005). 
Individuals who believe GMOs are safe for consumption are more likely to buy GMOs (Han & 
Harrison, 2007). And those who believe biotech benefits society are more likely to buy (Han & 
Harrison, 2007). More educated consumers are also more likely to support GMOs (Han & Harrison, 
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2007; Heiman, Just, & Zilberman, 2000). Individuals with a greater trust in the FDA are more 
willing to buy GMO products (Han & Harrison, 2007). 
Support for GMOs varies across income groups. A higher income tends to be correlated 
with a greater level of support for GMO products in the market place but a lower personal 
willingness to purchase the foods (Bukenya & Wright, 2007; Colson et al., 2011b; Kolodinsky & 
Reynolds, 2014; Loureiro & Bugbee, 2005). Wealthier and more educated consumers are less likely 
to be supportive of GMO (Kolodinsky & Renolds, 2014; Loueiro & Hine, 2002). Those earning 
less than $30,000 are more likely to buy GMOs but also tend to be more opposed to such products 
(Han & Harrison, 2007; He & Bernard, 2011).  
Those with strong opinions about GMOs or those who believe GMOs are a morally wrong 
are less likely to buy them (Bernard et al., 2009; Bukenya and Wright, 2007; Colson et al., 2011b; 
Han & Harrison, 2007; He & Bernard, 2011; Kolodinsky, 2008). Those who read more labels or 
are in favor of GMO labeling are less likely to buy as well (Colson et al., 2011a; Colson et al., 
2011b, Han & Harrison, 2007).  
Demographic characteristics also play a role in purchase decisions. Larger households tend 
to be more likely to purchase GMOs, for example (Colson et al., 2011b). Individuals who identify 
as ethnically white are less likely and blacks are more likely to purchase GMOs (Bernard et al., 
2009; Colson et al., 2011b). Individuals over the age of 55 are also less likely to buy GMOs but at 
the same time are more likely to support such products (Colson et al., 2011b; Han & Harrison, 
2007). Individuals with farming experience are less supportive of GMOs (Colson et al., 2011b). 
Although one study indicated greater support toward GMOs by females (Loureiro & Bugbee, 
2005), a larger number of studies indicated the opposite (Bernard et al., 2009; He, Bernard, 2011; 
Kolodinsky & Reynolds, 2014).  
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GMO Labeling Law History 
 
 On May 8th, 2014 Vermont became the first state in the U.S. to successfully pass a GMO 
labeling law H.112 (Vermont General Assembly, 2014). The act took effect in July of 2016 on a 
backdrop of approximately 70 unsuccessful attempts at legislation elsewhere in the country, 
including failed referendums in Colorado, Prop-105, and Oregon, Measure-92, both in November 
2014 (Colorado General Assembly, 2014; National Conference of State legislatures, 2016; Oregon 
Secretary of State, 2014). While many companies in Vermont and in the U.S. voluntarily began 
labeling products that contained GMOs, others actively lobbied against any state-based regulations. 
This opposition led to the passage of the national Public Law 114-216, which overturned Vermont’s 
initiative in August 2016 and shifted the obligation of labeling regulation to the U.S. Congress 
(U.S. Congress, 2016). In preparation to a federal policy requiring new nutritional labeling in 2020, 
a national debate is once again emerging between companies and regulators about the best labeling 
practice for GMO goods.  
 
Economic Theory 
 
 In order to evaluate the implications of a large-scale survey on the impact of the GMO 
labeling law, it is necessary to outline the logical steps that led to a response resulting in an 
acceptable reading of preference. Following Fishbein’s (1963) theory of attitudes, an attitude is a 
function of what an individual believes about an object and the evaluative aspect of those beliefs. 
Beliefs such as opposition to or support for GMOs, retrieved from surveys, are proxies for the 
individual intentions and purchase predictors (Grobe et al., 1997). The attitudes individuals hold 
with relation to an object (or idea) are correlated with the actions that individuals will demonstrate 
with regards to that object (Han & Harrison, 2007). As such, if a survey question asks an individual 
about their preference for a particular product, such as “Do you strongly support, support, are 
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neutral toward, oppose, or strongly oppose the use of GMOs in the food supply,” then the 
individual’s response serves as a valid predicter for that individual’s purchasing intentions with 
regards to GMO food.  
 A key assumption for markets to generate efficient outcomes is that information is perfect. 
Under the assumption of perfect information buyers and sellers possess the same amount of 
information about the products in the market place. This assumption seems reasonable in many 
real-world settings. In a globalizing economy with ever-longer and more complex product chains, 
even the country of origin of a product can be difficult to determine. Accordingly, in many 
environments, sellers have an informational advantage over buyers regarding various dimensions 
of product quality, especially if those dimensions of quality are difficult for consumers to discern 
after purchase.  
 The existence of informational asymmetries in many instances creates an incentive for 
sellers to signal that they are producers of higher quality goods, if doing so allows them to obtain 
higher prices for their products. In these cases, market asymmetries are voluntarily removed by 
producers to create niche markets for their goods. In the case of GMO products, the Non-GMO 
project encourages producers to voluntarily disclose that they do not use GMO products and in 
exchange receive the right to use the organization’s logo, incorporate a price premium, and enable 
the company to target a higher paying market (Non-GMO Project, 2016).  
 Voluntary disclosure of product information is typically reserved for product attributes that 
can increase the value of the product. If, instead, an attribute segments the market in an inferior 
direction, producers will tend to conceal the attribute. Akerlof’s (1970) research provides critical 
insights regarding the impact of asymmetric information on product quality. Akerlof’s model uses 
two products, “reliable automobiles” and “lemons”, where the former are more desirable and 
command a higher willingness to pay from consumers. According to Akerlof, if consumers are 
unaware of whether a particular car is “reliable” or a “lemon” but only know the probability 
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distribution of reliable cars vs. lemons, it is possible that only lemons will be sold if the probability 
that a randomly chosen car is reliable is sufficiently low. If most cars are lemons, and the probability 
of a lemon being reliable is sufficiently low, then there is no incentive to include reliable cars in 
the market as the buyers will apply the discount to all of the cars in the market. If the probability 
of a random lemon being a reliable car is sufficiently high, then the average price for lemons would 
increase as buyers see a higher probability that the purchase of a random car will result in a desired 
product.  
The interpretation of lemons can be extended to the market for foods. If there is a group of 
consumers who would prefer to not purchase GMOs, then for those consumers, buying a random 
unlabeled product is much the same as buying a lemon. There is a chance the consumers are going 
to randomly select a product that is GMO-free, if the probability of this is great enough, then they 
will tend to have a higher willingness to pay for the unlabeled food. However, if the probability of 
a product being GMO-free is sufficiently small, then they will assume that all products in the market 
place are GMOs and therefore will have a lower WTP for any unlabeled product.  
 Asymmetric information therefore provides a potentially market making role for 
mandatory product labeling regulations. A law requiring manufacturers to disclose whether or not 
their foods contain GMOs reduces information asymmetry about perceived product quality. As a 
result, separate equilibria can emerge in which both GMO using and GMO-free products are sold, 
and in which GMO-free products command higher prices than GMO using products.  
 
Data 
 
This study focuses on Vermont, Oregon, and Colorado. Two distinct data sets are used in 
this study. The first includes prices and sales of products in Vermont and Oregon before and after 
Vermont’s legislation took effect. The products are juices, juice drinks, cereals, and fruit sauces. 
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About half of the products included are GMO. The data are segmented into the unit of 
product/week/state. A total of 10 weeks of data are available in each period covering the same set 
of weeks one year apart. The second sat of data are surveys collected in Vermont and nationally. 
These surveys also cover the time before and after the execution of Vermont’s GMO labeling law. 
The key dependent variable in these surveys is a Likert scale question pertaining to level of support 
or opposition to GMOs in the food supply. Demographic variables collected from the survey are 
included in the analysis. In both data sets, the independent variable of interest is the interaction 
term of Time and State, and in the case of the prices and sales set, GMO.   
With regards to the sales and price data of GMO and non-GMO goods, the original aim 
was to use a state with similar characteristics as Vermont in order to have a strong control. New 
Hampshire or Maine would have been ideal candidates. However, after discussions with company 
representatives who were involved in labeling, it became clear that most products have regional 
markets that share a label. Vermont is not a large enough state to justify unique labels. As a result, 
all of New England is in the same labeling market. The rationale for using Oregon is that it is not 
in the same marketing region as Vermont but shares many of the same characteristics. Given that 
beliefs and ideology are considered among the most influential components of predicting attitudes 
towards GMO foods, Oregon was selected for the project as it has a relatively similar ideological 
makeup and is a relatively small coastal state not in the Northeast. The edge for Democratic 
presidential candidates exceeded 10% in the last three elections in both Oregon and Vermont. Both 
states have over one-third of the population living in a single metropolitan statistical area. Both 
states are within 6 hours of a major Canadian city. Finally, both states had major campaigns 
pertaining to GMO labeling.   
For the survey component, Oregon and Colorado are used because they had some sort of 
referendum and as such these states can be compared with Vermont. National data are available for 
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the needed time period also. Additionally, including Oregon in both data sets creates additional 
demographic controls.  
Many of the products used in this study can be considered breakfast food. Breakfast is the 
most likely meal to be consumed at home and, therefore, accounts for the lowest average 
expenditures, with only 28.2% of families eating breakfast away from home in a given week 
compared with 60.7% and 55.1% for lunch and dinner, respectively (Paulin, 2000). Bernard et al. 
(2009) used milk and cereal to model the presence of GMOs and preferences. Since breakfast is 
the most frequent meal eaten in the home, consumers would be most likely to know the ingredients 
of the breakfast foods they consume. Onyango et al. (2006) uses corn flakes, a GMO breakfast 
food, to estimate consumer WTP for genetically modified goods.  
The study uses data on breakfast-oriented foods. All of the products included are sold 
nationally and include both GMO and non-GMO items. None of the products included an organic 
label. The products used in this analysis include breakfast cereals, applesauce products, fruit juices, 
and fruit drinks.  
   
Logistic Models  
 
 Binomial and ordinal logit models will serve as the methods of interpretation for the survey 
data. The Likert Scale question pertaining to support for and opposition to GMO labels will be 
analyzed in a few different ways as a binary, truncated model, and as pseudo continuous (censored) 
model. The truncated and binary models are such that: Support + Strongly Support = Support, 
Oppose + Strongly Oppose = Oppose, and Neutral = Neutral.  
 Using Wooldridge (2009), I start with the simple model for a logit regression to explain 
the probability of an event. This form is based on a binary response with a limited probability 
model.  
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𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) = 𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑘), 
and  
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 +  𝜀 , 
Where 𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝒙) is the logit function of P, P is the response probability of an event y given a set 
of 𝛽𝑘 coefficients for 𝑥𝑘 independent variables, 𝜀 is the error term.   
This model can be transformed into a predictive model: 
?̂? = 𝛽0̂ + 𝛽1̂𝑥1 + ⋯ +  𝛽?̂?𝑥𝑘 +  𝜀 , 
Where ?̂? is the predicted value for the dependent variable, 𝛽?̂? is a set of predicted coefficients for 
the k independent variables, and  𝜀 is the standard error.   
 Interpreting the outcome of the model results in a simple model that captures a single effect of a 
binary output within the model.  
𝜑(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 +  𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 ) −  𝜑(𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 ), 
where 𝜑 is the transformation logit function.  
The resulting difference, when viewed as an odds ratio, can then be interpreted as a 
percentage point increase in probability. However, for our study, the primarily focus is on sign and 
significance, and less so on percentage of probability change. When interaction terms exist within 
the model, partial derivatives can be taken to isolate the partial effect of the interacting variables. 
The interpretation derived from a simple multinomial logistic model is parallel to that of Han and 
Harrison (2004) who used the model in earlier GMO preference studies.  
 In addition to the binomial context, this model can be applied to ordinal variables as well. 
This will be done in the second part of the analysis of survey data.  
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Ordinal Regression  
 
 Given the structure of the survey data, which uses a Likert scale, it is sensible to analyze 
the data using an ordered choice model. Following Greene (2012) the inferences can be made for 
interpreting an ordered choice model. Assuming the data are censored where each response 
indicates some level of utility greater than the previous response, then 
𝑅𝑖𝑚 = 1 𝑖𝑓 − ∞ < 𝑈𝑖𝑚 
∗ ≤  𝜇1, 
𝑅𝑖𝑚 = 2 𝑖𝑓 𝜇1 < 𝑈𝑖𝑚 
∗ ≤  𝜇2, 
𝑅𝑖𝑚 = 3 𝑖𝑓 𝜇2 < 𝑈𝑖𝑚 
∗ ≤  𝜇3, 
𝑅𝑖𝑚 = 4 𝑖𝑓 𝜇3 < 𝑈𝑖𝑚 
∗ ≤  𝜇4, 
𝑅𝑖𝑚 = 5 𝑖𝑓 𝜇4 < 𝑈𝑖𝑚 
∗ <  ∞, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑚 is an event, 𝑈𝑖𝑚 
∗ is the utility gained, and 𝜇𝑗 are the censored boundaries. Following 
McKelvey and Zavonia (1975) the ordinal model can be defined as  
Pr[𝑈𝑖𝑚
∗ = 1] =  𝜑[𝜇𝑘 − ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗]
𝑘
𝑖=  0 −  𝜑[𝜇𝑘−1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑗]
𝑘
𝑖=  0 . 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗 represents the independent variables in the model. Then we can estimate the utility as a 
linear function  
𝑈𝑖𝑚 
∗ =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑖1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖2 + ⋯ +  𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖𝑚 . 
Following Angrist and Pischke (2009) it is slightly more complicated to create a difference in 
difference estimation of a non-linear function. In order to be able to fully regress the model it has 
to be transformed into the function using Agresti (2010): 
log[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦 ≤ 𝑗)] = log [
𝑃(𝑦 ≤ 𝑗)
𝑃(𝑦 > 𝑗)
] 
=  𝛽𝑗 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚𝑥𝑖𝑚
𝑚
+  𝜀,      𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝐽 − 1 , 
where 𝛽𝑗 is the intercept for each censored level.  
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Difference in Difference  
 
 The difference-indifference estimator (DiD) is a regression model that normally compares 
the means of four different outcomes by a value and a time period. The goal of this estimation is to 
isolate the impact of a target event. In the case of this model the event is the passage of Vermont’s 
GMO labeling law. It is compared to the same time span as Oregon for price and to failed parallel 
events in Oregon and Colorado. By using the DiD estimator, it is possible to isolate the effect of 
the event without confounding it to other unobserved variables. This outcome is commonly referred 
to as the average treatment effect (ATE), where it is computed in one of two ways: (1) as a 
difference in averages taking the form of  
𝛿1 = (y1,E – y1,C) - (y0,E – y0,C), 
s.t 𝛿1 is the ATE, y is the average given time period T {0,1} and treatment category, state or GMO, 
Di {E,C} 
or (2) as the averages over time for each group given different time periods (Wooldridge, 2009). 
𝛿1 = (y1,E – y0,E) - (y1,C – y0,C). 
Both of these methods produce the same result as each is simply differencing a different aspect of 
the equation first but to the same end.  
 The simplest linear DiD estimation model can be presented as  
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖, 
where Di is a value equal to one or zero depending if the event occurred or not and y is the dependent 
variable of price or sales. The value of β2 is thus the coefficient of the test event (Greene, 2012). 
The model can then be expanded to include all of the four variables of space and time, including 
an interaction term. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + ∑(𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
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s.t.  ∑ 𝛽𝑘 𝑋𝑖𝑘 represents all other time constant and time varying covariates along with their 
parameters. 
Differencing the model results in the isolation of the treatment effect with  
(𝑦𝑖2 |𝐷𝑖 = 1) − (𝑦𝑖1 |𝐷𝑖 = 1)  =  𝛽2 + 𝛽4, 
and 
(𝑦𝑖2 |𝐷𝑖 = 0) − (𝑦𝑖1 |𝐷𝑖 = 0)  =  𝛽2. 
The final step of differencing isolates the interaction term 𝛽4 with: 
((𝑦𝑖2 |𝐷𝑖 = 1) − (𝑦𝑖1 |𝐷𝑖 = 1)) − ((𝑦𝑖2 |𝐷𝑖 = 0) − (𝑦𝑖1 |𝐷𝑖 = 0))  =  𝛽4. 
The model depends on the same assumptions as traditional least squared estimators (OLS).  
The additional assumptions needed to justify DiD are: (1) “Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption,” where treatments are completely present and there is no interaction between 
populations, (2) “Erogeneity” such that the components of X are not influenced by the treatment 
e.g.  
X0  =  X1 = X, ∀ x ∈ X, 
(3) “No Effect on Pre-Treatment Population,” where the treatment is uncorrelated with the 
pretreatment population, and (4) “Common Trend,” where the expected non-treatment outcomes 
are independent of the treatment effect or that the biases in each are consistent (Lechner, 2010). 
  
Ordinal Regressions in DiD 
 
 Following the logic of Kim and Lee (2017) it is possible to develop a DiD model for ordinal 
dependent variables. Assuming that variables are ordinal: 
𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑗 |𝑋, 𝛽𝑑) −  𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑗 |𝑋, 0),     𝑗 = 0,1,2,3,4 , 
where Y is the dependent variable with j categories, X is all covariates, and 𝛽𝑑 is the differencing 
parameter. The model can be further expanded into: 
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𝑃(𝑌1 = 𝑗 |𝑋1, 𝑄 = 1) − 𝑃(𝑌0 = 𝑗 |𝑋0, 𝑄 = 1) − {𝑃(𝑌1 = 𝑗 |𝑋1, 𝑄 = 0) −  𝑃(𝑌0 = 𝑗 |𝑋0, 𝑄 = 0)}, 
where Q = 1 for treatment and 0 otherwise.  
When this model is transformed into a regression form, then  𝛽𝑑 can be interpreted as a ratio in 
ratios such that the true value of  𝛽𝑑 = X/σu, where X is the returned value of the derivation that is 
then divided by the standard error (Lee, 2016) and where 𝛽𝑑  is the 𝛽 that references the differencing 
variable.    
Courtemanche and Zapata (2013) use interpretations of β on ordinal variables to be equal 
to the percentage point difference from the control when a continuous variable is used and then use 
a decrease in the standard deviation for ordinal variable outcomes.  
 
Logit in DiD 
 
 While a DiD model cannot be estimated perfectly within a logistic function due to the 
violation of the common trend assumption, there are ways to resolve the issue (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009). One approach is to treat the model as a linear probability model as in Ai and Norton (2003): 
Pr(𝑌 = 1| 𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝑥′𝛽. 
 If a model uses a limited dependent variable expressed in a standard DiD distribution, then 
a probit or logit model can be justified with the form  
𝑌𝑖 = 1[𝑌𝑖
∗ > 0], 𝑌𝑖
∗ =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + ∑(𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  . 
In this case 𝛽4 can still be interpreted as a DiD estimator because 𝛽4 is a logarithm of the “ratio in 
ratios” effect or odds ratio (Lee, 2016 p.143). The exponent of the coefficient of the differencing 
parameter, 𝛽4, can be interpreted as: 
(
exp(𝛽1 +  𝛽2 + 𝛽3 +  𝛽4 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘  )
exp(𝛽1 + 𝛽3 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘  )
)/(
exp(𝛽1 +  𝛽2 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘  )
exp(𝛽1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘  )
)  = exp (𝛽4) 
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Both the interaction term, 𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑖, and the time dummy,𝑇𝑡, can be accurately interpreted using this 
model. However, the other coefficients cannot be (Puhani, 2008). The most important interpretation 
is that the statistical significance of the 𝛽4 coefficient and its sign can be interpreted as directional 
even if the magnitude is harder to decipher (Puhani, 2012). This finding is simplified by Karaca-
Mandic et al. (2012), which shows a probit difference in difference variable for a binomial variable. 
While some authors state that this model is not appropriate for a binomial logit DiD analysis, there 
are peer reviewed examples that make an interpretation. Athey and Imbens (2002) replace the 
language of DiD to “Change-in-Changes” to interpret binary dependent variables with DiD 
methods. Mayer et al. (2014) use a logit DiD variable to isolate the impact of lending policies and 
interpret the coefficient for significance and sign, but do not attach an explicit value to the 
differencing coefficient. A second alternative to interpreting binomial dependent variable is by 
treating it like and OLS estimation as is done by Sun and Yannelis (2016).  
 
Multiple Controls DiDiD or Triple Difference  
 
 Difference in difference in difference (DDD) or Triple Difference (TD) is a model that 
includes another layer of control. In the case of the grocery store data, this is the non-GMO 
products. In this way we can isolate the effect of the law on only the products that were impacted 
by controlling for the non-impacted products.  
The TD model can take the form of either a simple linear model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑠 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 +  ∑(𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑠, 
where Ss is a subset of the population affected by the policy. In the case of the GMO labeling law, 
T is time, D is State, and S is GMO.  
The fully saturated TD model taken from Lee (2016) is: 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑠 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑠 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 +
 ∑(𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑠. 
In this case, β6 and β9  serve as the key interpretive variables.  
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CHAPTER 3. 
Do Mandatory GMO Labels Expand non-GMO Niche Food Markets? A Vermont and 
Oregon Case Study 
 
Abstract  
This study examines the short-term impact of 
Vermont’s GMO labeling law on prices and units 
sold using grocery store scanner data. Using a 
triple difference or difference-in-difference-in-
difference model, we find that having mandatory 
GMO labels has neither an impact on the price nor 
units sold of a select set of GMO or non-GMO 
foods. We investigate reasons for these results and 
postulate the reasons for the lack of statistically significant impacts of the labels. We do find a 
consistent price premium for non-GMO foods at a rate of $0.05 per ounce regardless of place, time 
or label.   
 
Introduction  
 
Genetically modified organism (GMOs) have existed in the United States consumer food 
market since 1994 with the introduction of the Flavr Savr Tomato. In the past few decades, GMOs 
have become ubiquitous in many major US crops, with farms devoting 72.9 million hectares 
(MHA) to modified products as of 2016, accounting for 23% of all principal crops nationally 
(USDA 2017).  Specifically, 92% of all corn, 94% of all canola, and 100% of sugar beet acreage 
are now genetically modified (ISAAA 2016). With the expansion of GMO technology into more 
food products, a debate about the social, environmental, and health impacts of the technology 
ensued with proponents of the technology claiming there is no scientific basis for criticism and 
Abbreviations 
DiD – Difference-in-Difference  
GE – Genetically Engineered  
GMO – Genetically Modified Organism  
MHA – Million Hectares  
TD – Triple Difference  
WTP – Willingness to Pay 
 
24 
  
skeptics advocating for a precautionary approach. Vermont passed a GMO labeling law that took 
effect on July 1st of 2016 (Vermont General Assembly 2014). The law required that all products 
produced or partially produced with genetic engineering (GE) must include a simple disclosure 
stating the use of GE (see Figure 1 for examples). The law was short lived as it was overruled one 
month later by federal law aimed at creating a single mandatory labeling scheme across the U.S. 
(U.S. Congress 2016).  
Figure 1.  
GE Labels in Vermont 
 
To examine if Vermont’s 
labeling law had an impact on the market 
for GMO and non-GMO goods in the 
short term, we test whether a change in 
prices or units sold occurred following 
the enactment of the law. If the price or 
sale of non-GMO goods increased in 
response to the law, then one could argue 
that the law successfully produced a 
distinct market for non-GMO goods.  
For this study, we examine the 
possible emergence of a non-GMO 
premium market using a sampling of 
grocery store scanner data from major 
grocery stores located in Vermont and 
Oregon corresponding to the time before 
and after Vermont’s labeling law. Oregon 
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was selected as a control for this comparison due to its similarity to Vermont demographically and 
ideologically while being far enough geographically from Vermont to minimize the probability of 
sharing regional labeling regimes. While a neighboring state like New Hampshire may originally 
seem as a more appropriate comparison, Vermont’s law impacted retailers who produce identical 
packaging for the entire New England or the East Coast region (Qorpak, 2018). Specifically, we 
focus on two major categories of products, fruit beverages and breakfast cereals, along with a 
smaller category of fruit sauces.  
 All prior studies that assessed the relative prices and sales of GMO and non-GMO goods 
did so with either surveys or laboratory experiments. As a result, these studies did not have a truly 
random selection of participants, as a selection bias applies for those who wish to participate in 
food-related studies or surveys. Secondly, this study is the first example of a non-hypothetical 
experiment that uses actual data from consumer behavior. This feature reduces the impact of 
experimental design in influencing the choices that participants made. Instead, the natural 
experiment was created by the “treatment” of Vermont’s law and customers responded in a natural 
way, as they would respond to any other product labeling change in an actual market place. 
Collectively, these aspects of our data permit the utilization of more robust econometric methods 
that are not feasible with data that are structured in survey format or that have too small of a sample 
size, as is the case with many prior studies (Bernard et al 2009; Brun and Campbell 2016; Buhr et 
al. 1993, Bukenya and Wright 2007, Colsen and Huffman 2011; Colsen et al. 2011; Han and 
Harrison 2007; Huffman et al. 2003; Loureiro and Hine 2002; Lusk 2003; Lusk et al. 2001; 
Noussair et al. 2002; Rousu et al 2007; Wachenheim and VanWechel 2004).  
The primary methodology utilized in this study is a triple difference (TD) or difference-in-
difference-in-difference model. The TD model is useful as it allows us to control for time, location, 
and product characteristic, controlling for as many available background trends as possible in the 
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estimation of the marginal impact of the labeling law. Product fixed effects are included in the 
model to prevent a false notion of randomness that would not occur in panel data.  
 
Literature Review and Setting  
 
Labels can have disparate impacts on the demand for consumer products. Before Vermont 
had a mandatory GMO labeling law, the state experimented with mandatory recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST) labels. Between September 1995 and August 1996 any product containing 
rBST had to be labeled. The method for labeling involved the use of small colored stickers along 
with interpretive flyers. The result of this intervention did not have any meaningful impact on sales, 
prices, or opinions but did succeed in adding a burden for grocery stores (Kolodinsky et al. 1998).  
Non-mandatory labels tend to highlight beneficial aspects of products, thus making it easier 
to justify a price premium. Once the public discovered, for example, that tuna fishing practices 
were harming dolphins, demand for tuna decreased. Once the Dolphin-Safe labels were adopted by 
the industry, the demand rebounded to higher levels and prices than before the public outcry (Teisl 
et al 2002). In contrast, when grocery stores in the United Kingdom began including carbon 
footprint labels that highlighted lower environmental impact on their packages, there was no change 
in price or demand (Kortelainen et al. 2016). 
One of the most common forms of labeling that most consumers are accustomed to are 
nutrition labels. Front of package food labels are intended to inform consumers. Simple labels such 
as “stop light” color signifiers are the most effective at communicating nutritional value to 
consumers (Borgmeier & Westenhoefer 2009; Emrich et al. 2014). The general impact of nutrition 
labels is that while about 89% of consumers claim to use them, researchers have found that only 
about 69% of consumers can accurately decipher their meaning (Rothman et al. 2006).   
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A major topic of study in the GMO debate is the consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for 
GMO and non-GMO goods when both options exist. WTP is the highest price at which an 
individual is still willing to purchase a single unit of a product. Using the Bonroy and Constantantos 
(2015) utility function where labels are both costless and fully reveal product characteristics, we 
can frame WTP as  
𝑈(𝜃) =  𝜃𝑞 − 𝑝, 
where q represents quantity, p, price, and U(ϴ) is the consumer willingness to pay for a given 
product.  
The majority of GMO WTP studies have used either auctions or laboratory style 
experiments to ascertain the wiliness to pay for GMO and non-GMO goods. The findings of these 
studies are not very useful in a real-world context because of the way the technology is interpreted. 
The studies do not tend to produce consistent results as many of them focus on GMOs that have a 
benefit to consumers, such as lean meat or added nutritional value, neither of which are product 
features that currently exist in the consumer market (Buhr et al. 1993; Loureiro and Bugbee 2005). 
The vast majority of GMO technology is oriented around increasing efficiency in agricultural 
production, not on improving nutritional traits (USDA, 2017). 
Some studies that focus on GMO WTP look highly processed leisure foods such as corn 
chips, potato chips, muffins, and cookies (Huffman et al., 2003; Lusk et al., 2001; Noussair et al., 
2002, Rousu et al., 2007; Wachenheim and VanWechel, 2003). These studies tend to consistently 
show a higher WTP for non-GMO products. Research by Milkman et. al (2010) shows that 
consumer decisions about less healthy foods tend to be less thought out than decisions to purchase 
healthier alternatives.  
Of the studies that include less processed food, such as tomatoes, broccoli, potatoes, and 
salmon, participants were willing to pay a premium between 1% and 21% for non-GMO foods over 
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that of the GMO equivalent (Bruno and Campbell 2016; Bukenya and Wright 2007; Colsen et al. 
2011; Rickertson et al. 2017). The aggregate of these findings indicate that in the marketplace we 
could expect non-GMO goods to carry a price premium because consumers tend to value them at 
a higher WTP, but the magnitude of the premium is uncertain. While these studies were able to 
isolate survey and experimental responses, it is unclear if the same WTP would be reflected in the 
consumer market.  
New technology has expanded the way in which consumer data can be analyzed. With the 
development of grocery store scanner data, it is easier to track changes in units sold and prices for 
products in the United States. Grocery store scanner data has been used to analyze a number of 
consumer economics questions, including that the use of positive nutrition value shelf labels have 
an impact on quantities sold and prices (Berning et al. 2010). Research conducted by Taylor and 
Tonsor (2013) found that country-of-origin labels do not have a statistically significant impact on 
sales. Using scanner data, Campbell and Eden (2014) found that the price for new products 
fluctuates before reaching a stable state. Grocery scanner data has also been used to analyze 
package size pricing, timing of sales, and predictive models for out-of-stock expectations (Shreay 
et al. 2016; Berck et al. 2008; Andres et al. 2010).  
 
 
 
Theoretical Approach  
 
Neo-classical economic theory indicates that the introduction of mandatory labels into a 
consumer market would result in product segmentation and premiums. Because GMOs produce 
additional value primarily to the farmer rather than the consumer and a fear of GMOs exists 
(Greenpeace, 2018; Just Label It, 2018), the general expectation would be that the introduction of 
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labels would either create a discount for GMO goods or a premium for non-GMO goods. The 
reasons being (1) that farmers presumably use GMO seeds instead of non-GMO because of a lower 
cost of production and can thus sell their products for a lower price while still being competitive 
and (2) for the consumers who fear GMOs, presumably a higher WTP exists for non-GMO 
products. Akerlof (1970) provides key insights into this model with the impact of asymmetric 
information in the market for “lemons” and reliable automobiles. While Akerlof’s lemons are not 
inferior goods, reliable automobiles simply have a lower probability of risk, which is valued by a 
risk neutral and utility maximizing consumer. If consumers are risk-tolerant, then they would be 
more likely to always select for the lemon, given it has a possibility of being equally valuable to a 
reliable car but at a lower price. When competitive information market segmentation exists, we 
would tend to assume that farmers choose to use GMO crops because of a lower cost such that 
𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝑀𝑂 >  𝐶𝐺𝑀𝑂 , 
and  
𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝑀𝑂 >  𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝑀𝑂        𝑎𝑛𝑑      𝑃𝐺𝑀𝑂 >  𝐶𝐺𝑀𝑂 , 
then  
𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝑀𝑂 >  𝑃𝐺𝑀𝑂 , 
where P is the price and C is the costs of non-GMO and GMO goods.  
When access to information is asymmetric, i.e. when producers know which products 
contain GMOs while consumers do not, then the market for a second good can disappear if the 
expected value of a randomly chosen food product is less than the marginal cost of a non-GMO 
item.  As per Akerlof’s model, assuming a risk neutral, utility maximizing consumer, the market 
for non-GMO goods will not exist if the probability of  
𝜋 <
𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝑀𝑂− 𝑃𝐺𝑀𝑂
𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝐺𝑀𝑂− 𝑃𝐺𝑀𝑂
, 
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where π is the probability threshold. The probability threshold is such that if π is sufficiently small, 
then there will be a lemon only market known as pooling equilibrium.    
Following this logic, if consumers are unable to determine whether a given food product 
uses GMO and the probability that a randomly chosen food item contains GMO is sufficiently high, 
then asymmetric information may result in only GMO foods being sold. In this case, price would 
not serve as a sufficient signal of product differentiation and consumers would assume the 
probability of purchasing a non-GMO product is sufficiently small as to be improbable. Thus, the 
price alone would guide consumer decisions precluding the possibility for a non-GMO market.  
 Asymmetric information therefore provides a potentially market-making role for 
mandatory product labeling regulations. A law requiring manufacturers to disclose whether or not 
their foods contain GMOs reduces information asymmetry about product attributes. As a result, a 
separating equilibrium can emerge in which both GMO and non-GMO products are sold, and in 
which non-GMO products command higher prices than GMO using products. Past studies on 
GMOs have shown that separate markets for GMO and non-GMO goods exists with 10-20% of 
consumers preferring only non-GMO goods (Buhr et al. 1993) and 32-65% of consumer unwilling 
to pay any premium for non-GMO goods (Brun and Campbell 2016; Loureiro and Bugbee 2005; 
Loureiro and Hine 2002) 
 
Data and Empirical Approaches  
Data 
For our study we used a data set of grocery store scanner data provided by IRI, a market 
research company that provides retail market data, that includes a sample of price and units sold 
data for breakfast foods from major grocery stores in Vermont and Oregon. To accurately assess 
the impact of Vermont’s labeling law, the selection of an appropriate control group is critical. In 
order to have effective experimental design, control groups serve as the background tend that would 
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have been expected had no intervention occurred in the tests case. Oregon was selected for this 
study as a control group because it is a demographically, ideologically, and geographically similar 
to Vermont and that it is in a different product marketing area. The use of a neighboring state such 
as New Hampshire may have been more appropriate demographically. However, if a food 
processing company is large enough to have multiple labeling areas, GMO labels could also be 
found elsewhere in New England or even over a larger area after Vermont’s label law was passed. 
The company would not have had to change the labeling for its West Coast market. Oregon was 
chosen for a number of similarities to Vermont: both states had GMO related legislation or 
referendums2, each state has the smallest population in its region, more than a 10% lead for 
Democratic presidential candidates in the last four elections, over 34% of the population live in a 
single metropolitan statistical area, and each state is within 6 hours of a major Canadian city3.  
The data cover two parallel time periods, July 5th through September 12th of 2015 and July 
3rd through September 10th of 2016, thus controlling for seasonality. These data include a total of 
3,547 samples of week/state/product prices and sales such that a single data point represents one 
product in a state for a given week. A total of 91 products are included in the set, which are sold in 
both Oregon and Vermont in both 2015 and 2016, 80 of which are sold in every week of the sample 
set.  
The set is made up of the following products: 55.7% juices and juice drinks, 33.4% cereals, 
and 10.8% apple sauces. Cereals, apple sauces, juices, and juice drinks were selected as they are 
often consumed for breakfast, which is the meal most likely to be consumed at home and thus most 
likely to be purchased from a grocery store (Paulin, 2000). Breakfast being the most likely food 
                                                          
2 Oregon had a failed referendum to label GMO goods in November 2014 
3 Historically Vermont is influenced by Quebec just as Oregon is part of Cascadia, which includes British 
Colombia  
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consumed from the grocery store is important because it decreases the probability of consumers 
otherwise getting their meals from restaurants where they would not be exposed to the labeling law.   
Table 1 
Summary Statistics  
 Notes: Vermont = 1 if sample is from Vermont, T2 = 1 if sample from is 2016, T2 * 
Vermont = 1 if sample from Vermont and in 2016, GMO =1 if a sample contains GMOs, T2 * 
Vermont * GMO =1 if a sample is from Vermont, in 2016, and contains GMOs, Juice = 1 if a 
sample is a juice or juice drink, Cereal = 1 if a sample is a cereal, Units Sold Normalized is 
continues variable representing the number of units of a products sold in a state and week. Price is 
the per OZ price at the $0.01 level for an individual product.  
 
To have a balanced data set, approximately an equal amount of GMO and non-GMO 
products were included in the study with 47.7% of products GMO. Additionally, a similar amount 
of GMO and non-GMO products of each type, cereal, juice, and fruit sauce were used in the study. 
To account for different product volumes and normalize prices, all prices were divided by volume 
in ounces. To account for the different population size of Vermont and Oregon, 623,600 and 
4,143,000 respectively, all units sold in Oregon were divided by 6.64, the factor by which Oregon’s 
population exceeds Vermont’s. All the products are from companies that sell in both the Vermont 
and Oregon markets. Products that were made with GMO ingredients were labeled as such only in 
Vermont’s 2016 dataset. Any product with “organic” or a GMO-Free label was excluded from the 
study in order to remove effects unrelated to the passage of the GMO labeling law on consumer 
behavior. The inclusion of “organic” or GMO-Free labeled products would add an additional 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. N 
Vermont 0.506 0.5 0 1 3,547 
T2 0.494 0.5 0 1 3,547 
T2 * Vermont 0.253 0.435 0 1 3,547 
GMO 0.477 0.499 0 1 3,547 
T2 * Vermont * GMO 0.123 0.328 0 1 3,547 
Juice  0.557 0.497 0 1 3,547 
Cereal 0.334 0.472 0 1 3,547 
Units Sold Normalized 255.79 363.194 0 3,808 3,547 
Price ($0.01 per Oz) 15.34 18.01225 2.093 113.245 3,547 
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variable that signals product traits to consumers for which we did not have the resources to focus 
on in this particular study. Table 1 includes the summary statistics for variables  
in this study.  
 
Triple Difference Regressions  
 
The aim of our research is to test the null hypothesis that mandatory GMO labels did not 
lead to a price premium for non-GMO foods or decrease the units sold of GMO foods. The primary 
method used in our analysis is the Triple Difference (TD) regression, which is an expanded version 
of a traditional difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation. The DiD model not only controls for 
factors that impact the sales or price by creating dummies out of GMOs, but allows us to use the 
relative times to understand the impact of a targeted intervention. This approach allows us to gain 
a causal inference and not simply derive a correlation.  
Because our data include time periods before and immediately after the introduction of the 
GMO labeling regime, we are able to treat the labeling law as a natural experiment. By measuring 
the change in units sold and prices we are able to see what would have happened had the labeling 
regime not been implemented. The model is dependent on an assumption of independence for the 
assignment of the treatment and other unobserved variables. If independence does not hold, then 
there is bias in the model and it cannot be universalized.  Because all included GMO products were 
labeled in Vermont and no products were labeled in Oregon, this assumption holds.  
The TD model used in this study originates primarily from the work of Lee (2016). The 
model elaborates on Greene’s (2012) framing of a DiD model with product fixed effects as was 
done by Kortelainen et al. (2016).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑇2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑉𝑇𝑆𝑖 +  𝛽𝑉𝑇,𝑇2𝑇𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + ∑(𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠)𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡is the dependent variable representing price or units sold, 𝑇𝑡 is the time dummy (2016 = 
1), 𝑆𝑖 is the state dummy (Vermont = 1), 𝛿𝑖 represents the product fixed effects, and 
∑(𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠)𝑡 represents a weekly dummy for 19 of the 20 included weeks. We include the 
week dummies in order to prevent weekly product fluctuations that may be caused by promotional 
events or sales as was done by Kortelainen et al. (2016).  
Following Lee’s model, we elaborate from a single differencing effect to a triple difference 
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑇2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝐺𝑀𝑂𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽𝑉𝑇𝑆𝑠 +  𝛽𝑉𝑇,𝐺𝑀𝑂𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 +  𝛽𝑉𝑇,𝑇2𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽𝐺𝑀𝑂,𝑇2𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 +
 𝛽𝑉𝑇,𝐺𝑀𝑂,𝑇2𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝐷𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 +  𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 + ∑(𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠)𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑠   , 
4 
such that 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑠 is the dependent variable, either prices or units sold depending on the model, Tt is the 
binary event-time variable (2016 = 1), Ss is the binary state variable (Vermont = 1), Di is the binary 
GMO variable (GMO = 1), Pits is the price variable in the sales regression. The variable 𝛿𝑖 controls 
for product fixed effects in the model. A weekly dummy ∑(𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠)𝑡 is included to 
control for exogenous time trends in either prices or units sold during the sample period. This model 
evaluates the marginal effects of each of the included variables and interactions terms to isolate 
how each influenced the dependent variable.  
 
Results  
 
The results of the TD regressions are included in Table 2. From left to right, the first column 
contains the variables used in the model, as well as the model tests of significance. The second 
column defines the variables reported. The third column (1) Price Dependent Regression with fixed 
effects, contains the results of the TD model using dollars per oz. as the dependent variable. The 
forth column, (2) Units Sold Dependent Regression with fixed effects, contains the results of the 
                                                          
4  𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑠 is only used in sales model. 
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TD model using normalized units sold5 as the dependent variable. All results are very short-term 
economic effects on sales and prices, since the research focuses only on the 10-week period 
immediately after passage of Vermont’s GMO labeling law. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the general 
trends of price change and units sold changes in Vermont and Oregon. Weeks 1-10 account for the 
time period in 2015, while weeks 11-20 account for the time period after the law’s implementation 
in 2016.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Units sold are considered in terms of Vermont, with Oregon normalized to Vermont’s population. The 
relative difference between Vermont and Oregon must be taken lightly because it is not clear if the exact 
same proportion of stores were sampled in each state with regards to the population and the information 
if proprietary to the IRI, the data seller.  
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Table 2    
Price and Units Sold 
regressions   
  (1) (2) 
 
Definition TD - Price Dependent 
(SE) 
TD - Unit Dependent6  
(SE) 
Constant  0.106* 406.689* 
  (0.005) (35.987) 
Vermont From Vermont 0.000 72.412* 
  (0.002) (12.567) 
T2 In 2016 -0.007 -39.131 
  (.004) (23.150) 
GMO Contains GMO -0.047* -323.099* 
  (.008) (48.006) 
VT*T2*GMO In Vermont, 2016, and  -0.002 -11.532 
 contains GMO (.004) (25.973) 
VT*T2 In Vermont and 2016 -0.003 27.156 
  (.003) (17.908) 
GMO*VT In Vermont and  -0.016* 18.615 
 contains GMO (.003) (18.3) 
GMO*T2 In 2016 and  -0.003 2.460 
 contains GMO (.003) (18.494) 
Price ($0.01 per Oz) Price per oz of unit  -11.011* 
 sold at $0.01   (1.0476) 
Fixed Effects Product fixed effects Yes Yes 
Week Dummies Dummy for each week Yes Yes 
N  3547 3547 
F-Test  995.1* 79.87* 
Adj-R2  0.9697 0.7189 
 Notes: Price dependent regressions are normalized by dollars per Oz where total price was 
divided by weight in Oz. Sales dependent regressions area normalized by Vermont’s population 
where sales in Oregon are divided by a factor of 6.64 to account for the relative population of the 
two states.  
 Significance at * p < 0.001.7  
 
In the price dependent model if a product is non-GMO, we can expect the price to be 
approximately $0.047 per oz. higher than its GMO equivalent. The trend of price difference is 
                                                          
6 Running a log(units sold) regression produced similar results with regards to sign and significance when 
testing for semi elasticity.  
7 No variables were found significant at the .01 significance level  
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reflected in Figure 2, illustrating the difference between the prices of GMO and non-GMO food in 
Oregon and Vermont. Products made with non-GMO ingredients tend to carry an additional 
premium of $0.016/oz in Vermont before and after the law came into effect based on the 
significance of the Vermont dummy variable. Perhaps most interesting, is the TD treatment of 
Vermont * T2 * GMO has no statistical significance, indicating that the passage of mandatory 
labeling of GMOs in Vermont did not create an additional premium for non-GMO products.  
 
Figure 2 
Ave. Price of GMO & non-GMO Food in VT & OR 
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Figure 3 
Ave. Units Sold of GMO & non-GMO Food in VT & OR
 
For the unit dependent model, it is important that the units listed do not carry an exact value 
but should be viewed only in relation to one another. This is because we do not know how many 
stores are in each state or what percent of stores in each state was sampled relative to the state 
population. For this reason, while Vermont has a statistically significant and positive value of 
72.412 additional units sold than Oregon, it is difficult to accurately assess if Vermont consumers 
purchase more food from grocery stores than their Oregon counterparts.  
The relative units sold of non-GMO goods to GMO goods, 323.099 more units of non-
GMO goods, initially indicates that more non-GMO goods tend to be sold. However, the sampling 
intentionally included a balanced set of GMO and non-GMO products, whereas an actual grocery 
store shelf would have a much larger percentage of products with GMO than non-GMO products. 
This difference could be explained by a relative preference for non-GMO goods for the specific 
subset of products included in the data set. The significance of price with a coefficient value of -
11.011 cents per oz. indicates that this model follows basic economic principals in so far as 
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increasing the price of a good results in lower demand. The treatment term of Vermont * T2 * 
GMO is not statistically significant even at the .1 level indicating that the law had no effect on 
relative units sold, and therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no impact.  
 
 Discussion and Further Research  
 
 In our effort to isolate the impact of a mandatory GMO labeling regime on the price 
premiums and units sold of non-GMO goods, several plausible explanations support the statistical 
significance and insignificance of the results of the econometric modeling work. When developing 
our experiment, our primary goal was to isolate the effect of our interaction term of Vermont, GMO, 
and the time period after Vermont’s GMO labeling law was implemented. The theory behind this 
interaction term is that it should isolate the impact of labeled and unlabeled products. This study 
adds to food consumption and labeling literature in a few major ways. Our main finding is that the 
labeling law had no effect on the prices or units sold of non-GMO products. We do not reject the 
null hypothesis that the creation of simple GMO labeling requirements has no effects on the units 
sold or prices of GMO products. It is important to remember that in this study, we only have the 
data for the 10 weeks that the law was in place and the 10 control weeks from the prior year. As 
such, it is possible that a more significant impact could have developed over time as prices can be 
“sticky.”  
This study adds to the growing, but still limited, collection of empirical work, which 
focuses on the impact of GMO product labeling. While a large selection exists that uses survey and 
laboratory style experiments, there is a marked lack of peer reviewed articles using real world 
consumption data as it relates to GMO and non-GMO prices and units sold. One policy implication 
of our study is that simple labeling could be implemented without affecting either units sold or 
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consumer prices, especially because 92% of Americans support labeling according to a Consumer 
Reports National Research Center survey from 2014.    
 Perhaps the most interesting statistical finding is a fixed number for the price premium of 
non-GMO goods. That non-GMO products can sell for $0.05/oz. more than their GMO counterparts 
provides valuable information for producers. This is the equivalent of a family size (19.5oz) box of 
non-GMO cereal costing about $1 more than the GMO containing substitute. Following Akerlof’s 
(1970) theories of secondary markets, it becomes safe to say that if the two products are 
differentiable, one can be sold for a higher price. The major implication for this may be for products 
that are labeled as “Organic,” which according to the USDA definition cannot contain GMOs, or 
Non-GMO Project Verified (Non-GMO Project 2016; USDA 2013). Producers of products that 
carry these explicit designations of Non-GMO may be able to successfully inform consumers that 
they are justified in charging an additional $0.05/oz.  
 Units sold were included in this model in order to see if the law resulted in a change in the 
quantity sold due to mandatory labels. If any of the coefficients that were dependent on the 2016 
variable were statistically significant, then we would have been able to infer general time trends. 
The potential trends would be those of purchasing food from the grocery stores of time, a general 
regarding GMO foods over time, a general trend regarding purchasing food in either state over 
time, and most importantly a trend about GMO foods in Vermont. The time trend about GMO food 
in Vermont would indicate that the law had an effect on the units sold.  
 An important limitation of our research is that we intentionally used a balanced set of GMO 
and non-GMO foods in our study so that the size of each state/week/products group was roughly 
consistent. The implication is that while comparing the probability of a single GMO product to a 
single non-GMO product may show a relative change, it does not reflect the coverage of an average 
grocery store shelf. This limitation specifically impacts the findings from the unit dependent model 
as it relates to the 323.099 additional units sold. If the set of GMO and non-GMO products was 
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reflective of the actual number of each product on a standard grocery store shelf, then this number 
would carry greater significance.  
A second limitation in our study is that we only worked within the very short period after 
the law was enacted. It is possible that prices are much stickier and would have taken longer to 
adjust. Unfortunately, we were only able to work with the natural experiment that occurred and 
later data would no longer have been required to carry the key differencing variable as producers 
are no longer required to include simple labels in Vermont. A second aspect of this is that we 
focused only on products that existed in all available time periods and states. As such it is possible 
that some products left or entered the market in response to the law.  
 Our analysis focused exclusively on the relationship between GMO and non-GMO labeled 
goods. We did not include either Organic or Non-GMO project verified in our study. Future 
research should compare the findings of the study that we completed with additional data that codes 
for “Organic” and “Non-GMO Verified Project” to see if the GMO-Free labels generate an 
additional premium above that which is already captured by not including GMOs.   
 Despite limitations, the potential impact of a GMO labeling law is a consistent outcome of 
all the models. This study utilized a real-world natural experiment and market data, an approach 
that has not been used in prior studies.  
 
Conclusions  
 
 We studied the effect of Vermont’s mandatory GMO labeling law, which was in effect in 
2016, on price premiums and units sold for non-GMO goods. In order to do so we used grocery 
store scanner data from Vermont and Oregon for two parallel seasonally adjusted time periods in 
2015 and 2016, with Oregon as out control group. Based on our regressions, the mandatory GMO 
labels had no statistically significant impact on the units sold or prices of either GMO or non-GMO 
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goods. We did find that the average premium for non-GMO goods is about $0.047/oz. relative to a 
similar GMO good, which was consistent before and after the law. When controlling for important 
variables such as price, we found that our data reflect fundamental economic principals where 
higher prices result in fewer units sold.  
Once the GMO labels appeared consumer decisions that existed prior to the law persisted; 
the labels did not cause more consumers to switch to non-GMO products. A secondary market 
already exists that is satisfied by Organic and Non-GMO Project labeling.  
Since prices and units sold of the labeled products were not impacted, this research serves 
as support for mandatory labeling by protecting consumer choice and facilitating symmetric 
information in the marketplace. An additional implication is that the food industry need not be 
concerned about mandatory GMO labeling laws as they relate to prices or units sold. This would 
allow companies to spend fewer resources challenging potential laws, thus increasing their overall 
profits.  
The mandatory labeling law did not raise prices of food included in the study nor cause a 
drop in the units sold of GMO foods. Both conclusions have been asserted by opponents to labeling. 
In the short-run, under a mandatory labeling scheme, neither occurred.  
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CHAPTER 3.  
Do Mandatory Labeling Laws and Referendums Affect Opinions on GMOs? 
 
Abstract  
A debate about the impacts of mandatory Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) labeling laws 
has existed since the introduction of the products. Vermont is the only state to have successfully 
passed a mandatory labeling law before it was overridden by federal policy one month later. The 
objective of this research is to evaluate if the successful law impacted opinions differently than 
failed referendums in Colorado and Oregon. This study uses Vermont and national survey data 
and analyzes it using a series of differencing models. The key findings are that Vermont became 
more supportive of GMOs after the passage of the law and that states with referendums became 
more supportive of GMOs than those without. The implications of this study are that both labeling 
laws and failed referendums increase the level of support for GMOs in the food supply.  
 
Introduction  
 
 Vermont was the first and only state in the US to implement a mandatory genetic 
engineering labeling law, VT H112, which was in effect July 2016 before being overridden by 
federal policy one month later. While Vermont’s law was in place, all products produced or 
partially produced with genetic engineering (GE) were required to have simple labels on their 
packaging. Prior to the passage of Vermont’s law, as many as 70 bills and referendums in 25 states 
were introduced that attempted to mandate the labeling of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 
(Farquar, 2016). Colorado and Oregon are two states that had referendums in November 2014, prior 
to Vermont’s law.  
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 GMO food tends to be a contentious issue in the United States with many individuals 
falling into the extremes of strong support or strong opposition to their presence in the food supply 
(Huffman and McCluskey, 2014). Willingness to pay (WTP) experiments found that 10-20% of 
consumers would refuse to purchase GMO goods while 32-65% would refuse to pay any price 
premium for non-GMO goods (Bruno and Campbell, 2016; Buhr et al., 1993; Loureiro and Bugbee, 
2005; Loureiro and Hine, 2002). Manufacturers and retailers of GMO food claim that mandatory 
labeling of GMO products would result in greater opposition to GMOs (Messer, Constanigro, and 
Kaiser, 2017).  
A null hypothesis that would help resolve this debate is to see if opinions about GMOs 
change in response to mandatory GMO labeling laws or failed referendums. To test this hypothesis, 
a natural experiment is used with Vermont as a test case and Oregon and Colorado as controls. 
These two states are used because data are available for a sufficiently robust time period before and 
after their referendums. To further test the hypothesis, a second evaluation is conducted where 
Vermont, Colorado, and Oregon are combined as the experimental group and compared to a control 
of the rest of the country, excluding a few states that had referendums but for which sufficient data 
were not available. In all cases, the goal is to evaluate if the introduction of a mandatory labeling 
law or referendum resulted in a change in opinions pertaining to GMOs in the food supply.    
 For this analysis a combination of methods is used to analyze the way in which Vermont’s 
GMO labeling law impacted the opinions of Vermonters with regards to their perception of GMOs. 
Following Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018), a survey-based approach that combines data from a 
Vermont poll and a national poll is used in this study. The analysis focuses primarily on a survey 
question pertaining to the level of support or opposition to GMOs in the food supply consistent 
with the methodology used by Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018). The area of focus in this study is the 
interaction term that combines the state or states that had interventions with the time periods after 
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the interventions occurred. The goal of grouping Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont is to identify if 
GMO related laws and referendums cause a change in opinions of GMO in the food supply. 
 
Background and literature  
 
Products using GMO technology have exponentially proliferated since the introduction of 
the Flavr Savr tomato in 1994. As of 2016, many principal crops in the US use GMO technologies 
including 92% of corn, 94% of canola, and 100% of sugar beets by acreage (ISAAA, 2016). 
Farmers in the US dedicate approximately 72.9 hectares accounting for 23% of all principal crop 
cover nationally (USDA, 2017). As the prevalence of GMO crops becomes commonplace, a 
growing percentage, about 92%, of Americans support mandatory labeling (Consumer Reports 
National Research Center, 2014).  
Proponents of GMO technology are resistant to the mandatory labeling of GMO products 
for two frequently cited reasons: (1) GMO labels will scare and confuse consumers who will view 
labels as warnings, and (2) labels will drive up the prices of both GMO and non-GMO food. The 
“warning camp” believes that consumers do not have a good enough understanding of genetic 
engineering to make the correct market place decisions (Kolodinsky et al., 2004; Scientific 
American, 2013). The fear of mandatory labeling has resulted in a multimillion-dollar campaigns 
aimed at swaying consumers into accept GMO foods without mandatory labels (Coleman, 2016). 
This approach has been effective in preventing any state with a proposed law, voted on via 
referendum, from passing (Farquar, 2016). 
Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018) tested if the opinions in Vermont changed in response to the 
new law, VT H112, using difference-in-difference estimators. The findings of the study revealed 
that a 19% reduction in opposition occurred in Vermont relative to the rest of the country, after the 
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labeling regime was implemented. Using subsets of the data from the Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018) 
study, this research tests whether opinions changed in other states with similar proposed laws.  
 The theory driving this study builds on Fishbein’s (1963) idea about attitudes, where 
attitudes are a function of an individual’s belief that is focused on maximizing utility. Beliefs such 
as opposition to or support for GMOs, retrieved from surveys, are proxies for individual intentions 
and therefor predictors for consumer behaviors (Grobe et al., 1997). The attitudes individuals hold 
with relation to an object (or idea) are correlated with the actions that individuals will demonstrate 
with regards to that object (Han & Harrison, 2007). Thus, the opinions an individual espouses about 
GMOs reflects their actions as they relate to the products. If opinions about GMOs shift in a positive 
direction, it would indicate that there is greater support for the products in the market place, and 
vice-versa.  
 
Methods  
Data 
 
Data for this project was obtained from two separate surveys. Vermont data were obtained 
from phone surveys that occurred in March 2013, March 2014, March 2015, March 2016, 
November 2016, and March 2017. The data were merged with a second set of online nationwide 
surveys over the same time periods. Vermont data were removed from all national surveys so that 
the state’s responses would not be double counted. Connecticut, Maine, California, and Washington 
were removed from this study because all four states had referendums pertaining to mandatory 
GMO labeling. Both the national and Vermont data collection protocols were approved by the 
respective institutional review boards of the participating institutions.   
The structure of the questions in the two surveys follows the methodology of  Kolodinsky 
and Lusk (2018). Preliminary analysis presented by Pazuniak and Kolodinsky (2017) revealed that 
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similar enough questions about GMOs are accurate predictors for other GMO related questions, 
such that a specific question about a particular GMO trait will have a similar response as one about 
GMOs in general. Participants in Vermont were asked, “Overall, do you strongly support, 
somewhat support, have no opinion, oppose, or strongly oppose the use of GMOs in the food 
supply?” In the national survey the questions were framed as “How concerned are you that 
[genetically modified food poses] a health hazard in the food that you eat in the next two weeks?” 
In both cases, a value of 1 indicated the least worry or most support for GMOs and the value of 5 
indicated the most opposition or concern for GMOs, in both cases a value of 3 indicated neutrality.  
 
Figure 1 
Timeline of Regressions: Relative Time and Real Time Analysis  
 
 
In the first part of the study a comparison is made on the effect of Vermont’s law with 
Vermont serving as the experimental case and the failed referendums in Colorado and Oregon 
serving as controls. Instead of using identical time periods, relative time periods corresponding to 
before and after the different interventions are used, as is depicted in the top half of Figure 1. In 
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order to have a balanced and sufficiently robust set of data before and after the interventions, four 
time periods from Vermont were used. The T1, or before event, time periods in Vermont were from 
surveys conducted in March 2015 and March 2016. T2, or after the law, includes surveys conducted 
in November 2016 and March 2017. Data from Oregon and Colorado was more continues in nature. 
As such responses between June 2013 and November 2014 were used as the T1 period and survey 
responses between December 2014 and May 2016 were used at the T2 period.  
For the second part of the analysis, Vermont, Colorado, and Oregon are grouped as a test 
case and compared with the rest of the country, which serves as the control. Surveys conducted in 
Vermont during March 2013 and March 2014 are grouped with responses from the national survey 
that were entered between June 2013 and November 2014 to serve as T1, the time before 
referendums or laws. For the T2, after laws and referendums, Vermont’s surveys after November 
2016 are combined with national surveys from the same time until April 2017. For this part of the 
analysis, all responses between December 2014 and October 2016 are removed from the study in 
order to avoid having dates that would include both a before and after case for the experimental 
group as can be seen in the bottom half of Figure 1.  
 
Econometric methodology 
 
 Different methods are used to analyze the data: OLS, binomial logit, and ordered logit. In 
the OLS case, the Likert scale questions are treated as a continuous variable from 1 to 5. Two 
different binomial models are used: (1) combining support and strongly support into one group, 
and (2) combining oppose and strongly oppose into one group using methods from Wooldridge 
(2009) to interpret results. The ordered logit model uses the existing value order and is evaluated 
as a linear model following the methodology of McKelvey and Zavania (1975) and Agresti (2010). 
The purpose behind cross-referencing the different methods for the same set of data is to focus 
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primarily on sign and significance of the variables, due to the difficulty of accurately interpreting 
likelihood ratios in a difference in difference setting. For all the models, a simple and a more 
complex model are used. The complex models include demographic control variables including 
political party affiliation, household size, number of children, white, female, income more than 
$40,000 annually, college education or higher, and six age groups. In the second set of regressions 
that combine Vermont, Oregon, and Colorado, state fixed effects are included. The general models 
used in the regressions is:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽𝑇2𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑡 +  𝛿𝑖 + ∑(𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
where yit is the dependent variable composed of a version of the GMO support or oppose question, 
depending on the models design, Tt is the time variable where time after the event is set to equal 
one, Si is the state with target event(s) is set to equal one, 𝛽𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the variable of greatest 
interest as it the interaction of Si , and Tt  representing the law or referendums, 𝛿𝑖is the state fixed 
effect when applicable, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑(𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖𝑘) are the demographic control variables. In this regression 
model the goal is to isolate the impact of combined state and time effect that represent Vermont’s 
law in the first set of regression and the combination of Vermont’s law with Oregon and Colorado 
in the second set. By including the individual state and time variables separately, the combined 
trend can be properly specified.  
 
Results  
 
In this section the different regressions and findings seen in Tables 1 through Table 3 are 
evaluated. The first half of this analysis looks at the case of Vermont as test case with Oregon and 
Colorado as Controls The second half of this analysis evaluates the results of combining Oregon, 
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Colorado, and Vermont as the test cases and comparing them with the control of the remaining US 
states.   
 
Vermont, Colorado, and Oregon 
 
 In the comparison of Vermont, Colorado, and Oregon, an analysis is made as to whether 
having passed a successful law, that regulates the labeling of GMOs, has a different effect than a 
failed referendum. The before and after periods are relative to the states’ own histories such that 
Vermont’s intervention is after July 2016 and Oregon’s and Colorado’s are after November 2014. 
The general findings in Table 1, with regards to the preference for GMOs in the food supply in 
Vermont, show a general decrease in opposition and increase in support. The same trend is visible 
in Colorado and Oregon but to a lesser degree. This is evident due to the statistical significance and 
sign of the interaction terms coefficient in Table 2.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Sets Before and After Interventions  
 
 
 Multiple tests including OLS, binomial logit, and ordinal logit models were used in the 
analysis because the primary focus is not the magnitude of the difference but a focus on sign and 
significance of the interventions. If the interaction term representing the law has an impact, it would 
be visible through the statistical significance of the interaction term and the directional sign of the 
coefficient. None of the post-event coefficients are statistically significance indicating that a 
general time trend is not influencing different states opinions. If a general time trend was 
statistically significant, it would be difficult to interpret as the control and experimental groups are 
located on different timelines as is evident in Figure 1.  
Vermont is consistently more opposed to GMOs in the food supply than Colorado and 
Oregon. This opposition is irrespective of time and applied to both before and after Vermont’s 
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labeling law. Every model produced a similar result with a high degree of statistical significance 
indicating that it is extremely likely that Vermonters overall have a greater level of opposition.   
The most relevant finding of this set of regressions is the interaction term of Vermont and 
Post-Event. In all the regression models, a general decrease in opposition and increase in support 
occurred. The directionality of decreased opposition and increased support is evident as both 
binomial models have movement away from the opposition group. Table 1 shows that the level of 
support increases, and the level of opposition decreases, meaning that the change is not simply a 
function of neutral individuals moving towards support but also a movement away from opposition.  
 
Table 2 
Estimation Results of OLS, Binomial Logistic, and Ordinal Logistic Regressions Comparing 
Vermont to Oregon and Colorado 
 
Note Parenthesis indicate standard errors; levels of significance *** p < .01, ** < .05, * < 
.10 
 
Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont compared with the rest of the US 
 
 The second set of regressions that combine Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont as the test case 
and compare them to the rest of the US as the control build on the findings from the first set as is 
evident in Table 3. Additionally, these findings corroborate the findings produced by Kolodinsky 
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and Lusk (2018). This set of regressions is not affected by the relative time constraint as the time 
periods are consistent for both groups as the period of temporal overlap is removed from the data 
set as is shown in Figure 1. The second half of Table 1 indicates the same general trend of increased 
support that was evident in the Vermont, Oregon and Colorado model. In this context, Vermont 
has the largest growth in support for GMOs followed by Oregon and Colorado, while the rest of 
the country moves in the opposite direction.  
 The statistical significance of the Post-Event coefficient indicates that a general time trend 
is affecting the entire country with regards to opinions on GMOs. This movement can be 
specifically seen in the OLS, binomial support, and ordinal models where a statistically significant 
sign indicates a decrease in support for GMOs in the control states. In all of the models, Vermont, 
Colorado, and Oregon show an overall greater opposition to GMOs in the food supply. This attitude 
is independent of time and applies to the periods both before and after the referendums were voted 
on and after the law was passed. This statistically significant trend is corroborated by the general 
findings from Table 1.  
 When the time trend is combined with the test states a different picture emerges. In Table 
3, the statistical significance of the interactions term indicates that changes occurred in the test 
states after the law. Because the directional sign is in the opposite direction to the test states overall 
patterns and the overall time trend it evident that the laws and failed referendums decreased the 
level of opposition and increased the level of support for GMOs in the food supply, relative to the 
rest of the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
59 
  
Table 3 
Estimation Results of OLS, Binomial Logistic, and Ordinal Logistic Regressions Comparing 
the Grouping of Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont to the Rest of the US† 
 
Note Parenthesis indicate standard errors; levels of significance *** p < .01, ** < .05, * < 
.10 
† The rest of the US does not include Connecticut, Maine, California, or Washington due 
to lack of data during relevant times of the states’ referendums  
 
Discussion  
 
A major implication in this research is that even the idea of transparency eases public 
opposition to GMOs. The second set of regressions show that Colorado, Oregon, and Vermont all 
have consistently greater levels of opposition to GMOs before and after the event period. The 
implication of this greater level of opposition may be why the issue of GMO labeling went further 
in these states than in the rest of the country.  
The general shift in Vermont relative to Colorado and Oregon with regards to opposition 
to GMOs indicates that after the passage of the law, Vermonters become more comfortable with 
GMOs in the food supply. This finding would seem to bolster the argument that simple and 
transparent labels tend to decrease opposition and that the label is not perceived as a warning, 
contradicting the claims made by opponents of mandatory labels. Instead it is likely that as people 
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see labels on their food, they become more comfortable with the presence of GMO ingredients as 
they are no longer perceived as something that is intentionally hidden and therefore potentially 
unwanted.  
A national trend of opposition to GMOs in the food supply clearly exists based on the 
general time trend of the second model and the findings of Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018). Vermont’s 
larger, and Oregon and Colorado’s smaller movement in the opposite direction indicate that more 
information and discourse may increase support for GMOs in the marketplace. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that transparency and information makes consumers more comfortable with 
some forms of new technology such as GMOs.   
One of the potential shortcomings of this research is that by using relative time analysis 
where Vermont, Oregon, and Colorado use different time periods the general time trend that existed 
nationally is omitted. One of the reasons the second set of regressions that included that entire 
country was included was to give an idea of what the time trend would seem to be.  
A second short coming is the overall low R2 value of the different regression models. While 
a few of the models such as the Full OLS model in the Vermont vs Oregon and Colorado case did 
produce a meaningful value, the remainder of the models tended to explain a relatively small 
portion of the overall story. A possible solution to this problem is to include additional variables in 
future studies that help explain the remainder of the difference; however, this is not possible with 
historical data.  
For future research, it would be beneficial if survey responses from a longer time period 
could be analyzed. In this way it would be simpler to include the excluded states of Connecticut, 
Maine, California, and Washington, specifically as they relate to the relative time analysis. Other 
future research that would aid in this analysis would be to include sales and price data for the 
studied states in the same time periods. If purchases of processed foods that include specific 
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ingredients that are commonly known to be GMO are compared with GMO-Free food, then actual 
consumer behavior could corroborate the survey results.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The passage of Vermont’s mandatory GMO labeling law and the failed referendums in 
Colorado and Oregon provided an opportunity to evaluate the way in which different types of GMO 
legislations impact opinions of GMOs in the food supply. An expected trend in this context would 
be to assume that states that chose to reject legislation would have become more supportive of 
GMOs; however, the findings of this research present the opposite conclusion, where successful 
passage tampers opposition to GMOs more than failed referendums.  
The general finding of increased support for GMOs between Vermont vs Oregon and 
Colorado holds when compared to the rest of the country, but in an even more extreme context. In 
aggregate, Vermont, Oregon, and Colorado became increasing supportive of GMOs in the food 
supply while states that did not have any referendums or successfully passed laws became more 
opposed. The key implication of this finding is that if retailers and manufacturers of GMO products 
want to improve the attitudes of consumers as they relate to GMO products, then it is in their best 
interest to support laws and referendums that require labeling. This trend may already be adopted 
by many companies that have begun voluntarily disclosing their use of GMO ingredients without 
any law that mandates the behavior.  
The implications of this information are that product transparency increases acceptance of 
emerging technologies. While it is plausible that the opinions in Colorado and Oregon changed due 
to an increased amount of spending by pro-GMO sources on advertising prior to the referendum, 
the same does not hold for Vermont. Given that Vermonters’ level of support increased after the 
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implementation of the labeling law would seem to indicate that through increased transparency of 
food manufacturing processes consumers become more comfortable with GMO technologies.  
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this research was to evaluate the impact of Vermont’s GMO labeling law to 
better understand the impacts of GMO legislation. Prior studies tried to evaluate the potential 
impacts of such intervention primarily through survey and laboratory experiments conducted in 
limited regions or with small groups of voluntary participants. Unsurprisingly, such approaches led 
to a variety of results with regards to opinions and willingness to pay (WTP) for GMO and non-
GMO food. Given the context of these past studies and the work being conducted by Kolodinsky 
and Lusk (2018), an approach that focused both on a subset of the Kolodinsky-Lusk data and 
overlapping IRI grocery store scanner data was adopted. Differencing models and redundant tests 
that analyze both grocery store data and survey data were evaluated to form a general picture of the 
short-term economic impacts of Vermont’s law.  
With regards to the grocery store scanner data analysis, two notable conclusions emerge. 
The first is that the price premium for food that is non-organic, not “Non-GMO Project Certified”, 
non-GMO, healthy, and processed is approximately $0.05 per ounce. This finding can help end the 
debate that has continued with hypothetical WTP experiments and surveys. Past WTP studies have 
used somewhat arbitrary price levels and starting points to price a product, did not oblige 
participants to make binding choices (e.g. pay real money for one product or the other), and 
frequently did not even have a real product available. A result of previous methodologies is that 
the WTP amount varied significantly. The $0.05 per ounce derived in this study may not hold for 
all possible products, as some products are significantly more expensive per unit such as 
mushrooms or caviar. However, this study provides a better starting point than prior research.  
Future research should be conducted to see if other products that contain GMOs or various 
forms of non-GMO certification have an additional impact on these prices. As a larger variety of 
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products becomes genetically engineered, new questions can be asked with relation to the specific 
products.   
The second important finding of the study is the lack of significance of the key differencing 
variable as it relates to either sales or prices of GMO and non-GMO goods. The implication of this 
result is that mandatory labeling laws do not have an impact on consumer behavior. Consumers 
who want to avoid GMOs may already be doing by purchasing USDA Organic or Non-GMO 
Project Certified labeled products, may avoid processed foods, and thus implicitly avoid many of 
the GMO ingredients, or may pay close attention to ingredient lists that contain otherwise 
ingredients considered unhealthy such as high fructose corn syrup. Thus, they are not be affected 
by the mandatory label. However, as more products become genetically engineered, avoiding 
specific ingredients may become increasingly more difficult as more of the products listed on a 
given ingredient list may have a higher probability of being genetically engineered. This would 
lend credence to the argument that the labels are a good thing so that the consumers who currently 
avoid GMO products can do so in the future without being obliged to pay the additional price 
premium that the USDA Organic and Non-GMO Project may have.  
When evaluating the findings of the survey research, the most important conclusion is that 
both labeling and the visibility of referendums swayed citizens towards becoming more open to 
GMOs. Much of the past literature, even after Vermont’s experiment, voiced concern that labels 
would scare consumers (Messer, Constanigro, & Kaiser, 2017). This argument can be soundly 
rejected. Not only did the law in Vermont decrease opposition towards and increase support for 
GMOs in the food supply, but it also had no impact on the price or sales of GMO foods in relation 
to their non-GMO counterparts. It is worth noting that in the case of similar referendums in Oregon 
and Colorado, even though no labeling law was passed, bringing the discussion to public attention 
had an improved impact on the perception of GMOs.  
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An interesting finding that emerges from research into both sets of data is how Vermont 
compares with other states as it relates to GMOs. In the grocery store scanner set it was clear that 
the price premium for non-GMO goods in Vermont is about $0.016 more per ounce than in Oregon. 
Likewise, in the survey data set, the level of opposition to GMOs in Vermont was 22% higher 
before and 14% higher after legislation than in Oregon and Colorado. One conclusion that could 
be drawn from these combined pieces of information is that Vermonters tend to be more opposed 
to GMOs and therefore it was more feasible to enact legislation that mandated labeling. An 
alternative hypothesis could be that it is easier to have an impact on voters than in a legislative 
context to oppose mandatory labeling and anti-labeling groups were able to exert a greater impact 
in the referendum states.  
To summarize, GMO labeling may not have a large effect on consumer behavior, but it 
does increase acceptance of new technologies. As such, this study would recommend supporting 
clear and simple labels on the grounds of transparency and the lack of harmful impacts on prices 
or sales that labels produce. If companies using emergent technologies want to improve their 
relationship with the public and the perception of the new technologies, transparency may be the 
simplest and most cost-effective approach. On the other hand, if food producers wish to avoid the 
use of GMO ingredients, then by doing so they can charge premiums for their products of various 
size depending on the state. If demand for such products is relatively inelastic, and the profits from 
these premiums are greater than the costs incurred by companies in avoiding GMO ingredients, 
then a non-GMO niche market can comfortably exist.  
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